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Awareness has grown of the intimate link between climate change and migration
in past years but it remains a complex and contentious issue. In a debate fanned
by the media and populist politicians, University of Liège researcher Caroline
Zickgraf separates myth from reality. Explaining how our changing environment is
making people move, she calls for evidence-based preparation rather than fear-
based reactions and crisis responses. As climate change escalates, such
understanding is a first step on the way to a much-needed political response. 
The global impacts of climate change threaten to reshape the world in a dramatic fashion. From sea level rise,
coastal erosion, land degradation, droughts, floods, and temperature increase to intensifying and more frequent
storms, any number of detrimental impacts caused by a rapidly warming planet fundamentally changes how and
where we live. Sudden-onset events and slow-onset processes combine to damage and destroy homes and assets,
decrease crop productivity and biodiversity, forcing people from their lands and livelihoods. While some people are
forced to flee in a rapid fashion, others move preemptively or in response to the gradual changes that make living –
and earning – in situ ever more difficult, forming a complex spectrum of human mobility related to climate
change.  
This article intentionally takes a rather wide view of this spectrum, in order to tackle some of the most
common questions about how migration and climate change collide – and what should be done about it.  
What do we call them?
Discussions on the relationship between migration and climate change often falter at the first step: people do not
agree on what to label it and who qualifies for such labeling. In the initial days of raising awareness of the issue,
environmental activists and organisations likened the plight to that of conflict asylum seekers and refugees,
birthing the terms ‘environmental’ or ‘climate refugees’. In 1985, the first official mention of ‘environmental
refugees’ appeared in a UN Environmental Programme report. Undoubtedly, this naming brought with it an
urgency in tone ideal for calling attention to a nascent issue (not in occurrence but in visibility). Rather quickly,
however, refugee and forced migration (especially legal) experts piped in: simply put, these people are not
refugees. The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees makes no mention of environmental
disruption or climate change. It is a misnomer but also, many argued, dilutes the meaning of refugee. In
1997, Gaim Kibreab, a refugee studies scholar, stated that the term served to ‘depoliticise the causes of
displacement’ so that states would not be obliged to provide asylum.1 Others argued that ‘climate
refugee’ diminishes the agency of people and also that it obfuscates the multi-causality of migration, i.e. it is never
‘just’ climate change. Climate change is a threat multiplier; it cannot be isolated from social, political, economic,
environmental and demographic migration drivers. Lastly, it places a singular label on an extremely diverse
phenomenon.
A back-and-forth ensued and many became gun-shy to use the highly contested ‘climate refugee’. They instead
came up with a host of more nuanced, but also diluted, terms (e.g. migration in contexts of environmental change)
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or specific terms that steered clear of the refugee label (e.g. climate migrants, climate displaced persons, disaster
displaced). Several international organisations, NGOs, advocacy groups, and activists plowed on with climate
refugee, either unaware of the emerging scientific taboo and/or because they thought the forced nature of
movement warranted the refugee label and underscored its humanitarian implications. 
So where do we stand today? The short, but admittedly unsatisfying, response is that we have yet to reach any
consensus in name or definition. Academics, politicians, activists, and other actors employ many labels, sometimes
interchangeably, but there is still a taboo around using climate refugee. This goes hand-in-hand with the fact that
there is no consensual definition. In 2007 the International Organization for Migration put forth a rather broad
suggestion to cover a range of relationships between environment and migration,2 but that has never
been universally adopted. Many a roundtable and panel are convened to rehash these debates, but faced with
growing terminological fatigue, many actors now argue that political and humanitarian action do not require
a single, agreed upon name or definition. Action is more important than words. 
How many? 
Much of the discourse on climate and migration is what academics Andrew Baldwin, Chris Methmann and Delf
Rothe call ‘futurologies’. That is to say, it’s about what will happen in the future if nothing, or not enough, is done
to prevent further climatic change. Perhaps the most evident of this are frequently
cited estimates of (potential) future migration. These numbers have been highly influential in the media, but also in
political circles. Yet, the quantitative predictions regarding future migration flows vary widely in amount and
methodology. Alongside terminology, numbers have become one of the most debated topics in the field. In
2002, Norman Myers warned that as many as 200 million people could be displaced, “overtaken by sea-level rise
and coastal flooding, by disruption of monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes, and by droughts of
unprecedented severity and duration.”3 Through wide-spread repetition, this highly speculative figure is often taken
for fact. However, this and many other past numbers of how many people will move because of climate impacts or
environmental disruption were more or less guestimates, often based on a deterministic assumption that if we count
the number of people living in a vulnerable area, factor in population growth by 2050, then you’ve got your
number of future climate migrants. In some cases, these figures reach 1 billion! As pointed out by scholar François
Gemenne, Director of the Hugo Observatory at the University of Liège, the first scientific research center dedicated
to the environment-migration nexus, many of the forecasts generated in the 1990s and 2000s were united
by common features: they were received with great skepticism by scholars, but welcomed with great interest in
media and policy circles.  
Scientific assessments are certainly improving, with better modelling techniques and rigorous efforts to project
more accurate, evidence-based ranges of population movements. A 2018 World Bank report estimated that –
without urgent action – up to 143 million people could become internal climate migrants (moving within their
countries) in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and South Asia by 2050. Still, the 2019 Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere noted that while there is high agreement that
climate change has the potential to drastically alter the size and direction of migration, there is low
confidence in quantitative projections of migration. Future migration and displacement that is driven by the impacts
of climate change will largely come down to the mitigation and adaptation measures we take.
Importantly, we do not have a global figure for how many people are currently on the move owing (at least in part)
to the impacts of climate change and other forms of environmental degradation. What we do know is that disasters
are displacing millions worldwide. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated that 17.2 million people
were internally displaced by disasters in 2018 alone. By way of comparison, 10.8 million were newly displaced by
conflicts in the same year. But no global figure accounts specifically for all climate impacts and all types of
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migration currently underway (including more economic and voluntary forms of migration). Beyond global figures,
local, national, and regional data gaps are persistent challenges for actors seeking evidence-based solutions.  
Are ‘they’ coming to Europe? 
Certainly, numbers can grab people’s attention in a way that ‘it depends’ or ‘it’s complicated’ cannot. However,
focusing on figures exclusively obscures the many impacts of climate change on migration that go beyond volume
of movement, for instance temporality, agency and distance. Where people do and will go is certainly a critical
question for policy response to climate change and migration. Based solely on documentaries and news reports in
Western media, one could not be faulted for thinking that people are migrating en masse out of the world’s most
vulnerable regions (environmentally and socio-economically) in the Global South, and towards the countries of
the Global North. When the Global North steers narratives, it unsurprisingly tends to focus on their particular
concerns, i.e. how does this affect ‘us’? From a European perspective, climate migration readily conjures images of
overcrowded boats crossing the Mediterranean Sea. A 2010 Museum of London exhibit called ‘London Futures’:
‘Postcards from the Future’ digitally transformed the capital’s landmarks to show what the city could look like in a
world of climate change. Drawing on Kenyan and Moroccan influences, two startling images depict Nelson’s
Tower and Buckingham Palace surrounded by shantytowns of so-called ‘climate refugees’. This,
unsurprisingly, didn’t go over well.
The ‘threats’ of masses of people from developing countries landing on European shores are simply not based on
current scientific evidence, and thus do little to promote evidence-based policy decisions rather than fear- (and
prejudice-) based reactions. In fact, science suggests that when faced with the impacts of climate change most
people tend to migrate within their countries. Internal migration and displacement may indeed lead to international
movements, but it is unlikely that those people who are forced or who choose to leave particularly vulnerable
climate areas will all be able to make the journey to Europe – nor do they all want to. Migration, and especially
international long-distance migration, takes means – such as money, social networks, skills, visas, and even
physical ability to move. With climate change impacts, we see an increase in migration out of some areas, but we
also see a decrease in out-migration in others. As put forth by a 2011 seminal report on environmental change and
migration, the UK Foresight Report, “Environmental change is equally likely to make migration less possible as
more probable.” A decrease or stagnation in migration is not necessarily, therefore, something to celebrate. It can
denote a growing, and largely invisible, vulnerable population: those that are in danger but unable to get out. When
this happens, the humanitarian implications have the potential to be enormous.  
Furthermore, climate mobility is not the exclusive ‘problem’ of the Global South. Coastal erosion, flooding,
hurricanes and storms are already displacing people in North America and Europe. Although it’s often articulated
as an issue for a distant other, with disasters growing in intensity and frequency European populations will also
face the consequences. A new modelling tool developed by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates
an average of 15 000 people will be displaced by floods in Spain annually, in France more than
28 000. Europe needs to prepare and plan for its own internal and intra-continental migration and displacement.  
How do we solve climate migration? 
The common implicit undertone in media, public and policy debates is that climate-related migration is an
inherently bad thing. People forced to move because of the impacts of climate change is by no means a positive
outcome of the continued rise of global greenhouse gas emissions. Climate impacts forcing people to flee their
lands, livelihoods and assets is a massive challenge facing an increasing portion of the world’s population.
However, looking at migration as an inherent problem that needs to be ‘solved’ overlooks the diversity of
migration and its benefits. Not all movements related to climate change occur due to force (i.e. displacement). In
some cases, (relatively) voluntary migration is just one of a host of adaptation strategies in place to respond to
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environmental change, whether it is temporary, circular, seasonal or permanent, a strategy which is undertaken by
choice and can have positive outcomes. Migration need not be the strategy of last resort. 
Pre-emptive, voluntary migration, in fact, can be a part of the solution to adapt to the impacts of climate change,
and to help reach the stated goals of the Paris Agreement: to address, avert, and minimise future
displacement.4 When crop productivity decreases, or natural resources deplete, people moving away from harm can
be beneficial to migrants, to their communities of origin and to their destination communities (whether within their
countries or in other countries). At the same time that migrants need to escape physical and economic harm, and
ultimately better their living conditions and opportunities, communities of origin can benefit from the financial and
social remittances that may result. Such remittances can lead to the construction of more disaster-resilient homes,
improve education, assist in local adaptation projects, and decrease dependence on local, natural resource-
dependent livelihoods, for example. Destinations can also gain from in-migration when it is well managed and
when people are integrated into local societies. They can solve problems of an aging population, i.e. ‘greying’
Europe, boost entrepreneurship and stimulate stagnating economies, and bring new skills and perspectives to local
challenges. Ultimately, this can lead to a ‘triple-win’ scenario: for migrants, for communities of origin and for
destination communities. 
Planning and preparing for migration for sending communities and destination communities is critical
to realise and maximise the beneficial potential of migration. Just as disaster risk reduction is preferable to post-hoc
disaster responses, facilitating migration in safe, orderly, and regular ways can decrease the risks for displacement
and ad hoc and crisis responses in situ. Several Pacific Island governments are developing a range of plans,
including international migration and relocation strategies. In the Republic of Kiribati, where two-thirds of its land
is less than two meters above sea level, the government developed the ‘Migration with Dignity’ policy. It aims to
improve education and skills training for its citizens in order to facilitate voluntary temporary and permanent labor
migration to nearby countries like New Zealand as a long-term adaptation measure. In other countries such as Viet
Nam, Sierra Leone and Fiji, municipal and national governments are implementing or proposing the planned
internal relocation of vulnerable villages and communities, taking a more drastic migration-as-adaptation approach.
Time will tell to what extent a world of climate change will be a world on the move. Climate action – both
adaptation and mitigation measures – will undoubtedly shape human mobility dynamics. International policy fora
such as the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) are increasingly aware of this, as signaled
by the creation of such platforms as the Task Force on Displacement, established through the Paris Agreement in
2015, and the Platform on Disaster Displacement. Tackling these issues does not, however, stop at the international
level. It requires coherent multi-scalar governance, including bottom-up local policies and programmes catered to
local realities.  
Preventing displacement and maladaptive migration also demands dialogue and action that stretch across our
traditional policy silos: climate, environment, migration, development, etc. At the EU-level, this
means coordination across relevant Directorate-Generals, but also coordination between EU and member states. For
example, both the EU and its members can make actionable commitments to implement the recent Global Compact
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, whose second objective is to address adverse drivers and structural factors
that compel people to leave their country of origin, including deteriorating environmental conditions. The EU can
also explicitly consider migration within climate financing, its development policies, and the European
Neighborhood Policy. EU and member state migration policies should also take climate change into account, for
example through bilateral labour mobility agreements with climate-affected countries, or by providing
humanitarian visas for displaced populations. 
In short, migration policies should address climate change, including the facilitation of migration for the most
vulnerable, while environmental policies need also address their impacts on migrants. Such holistic efforts can help
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protect the displaced, support self-determination, and address the vulnerabilities of those who stay as well as those
who go.  
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